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The social potency of affect: Identification and power in the immanent structuring of 
practice 
Abstract 
We address the centrality of affect in structuring social practices, including those of 
organizing and managing.  Social practices, it is argued, are contingent upon actors’ 
affectively charged involvement in immanent, yet indeterminate social relations.  An 
adequate understanding of this generative involvement requires a temporally-sensitive, 
critically-oriented theoretical framework, grounded in an affect-based ontology of practice. 
The relevance and credibility of this proposal is supported through an analysis of the 
interactions of Board members in a UK consulting company.  
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Introduction 
The significance of affect, including emotion, is rarely registered or appreciated in accounts 
viewing the social world as comprising practices (e.g. Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011). In 
empirical studies where practice is acknowledged to be affectively charged (e.g. Lok and de 
Rond 2013), the possibility that ‘affect affects’ practices is ‘seen but unnoticed’ (Garfinkel, 
1967); it is pervasive, yet remains unthematised. In this paper, we seek to develop and 
demonstrate the critical and empirical implications of paying direct attention to affect in 
accounting for the social structuring of practice(s). We are especially interested in the 
unfolding relationship between affect and the ‘basic grammar(s) within which possible 
objects are constituted’, which ‘mediates any kind of contact with reality’ (Bhaskar and 
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Laclau, 1998: 9). This grammar, which Laclau also terms ‘discourse’, is, they contend, 
‘largely unconscious…so the task of the discourse analyst is to explore the immanent 
grammars which underlie all kinds of meaningful intervention’ (ibid). 
Specifically, we will explore the affectively-driven operation of ‘unconscious, 
immanent grammars’, or discourses, enacted by directors of an IT consultancy, and so doing, 
seek to further the investigation of affect’s mediating action on social reality.  In addressing 
affect’s significance in the (re)production of mundane work in this organization, we rely upon 
the ‘Essex school’ of discourse analysis initiated by Laclau (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe 1985).  
The Essex school is distinguishable from other schools of discourse analysis in its 
(postfoundationalist) conception of the ‘structural undecidability’ (Laclau 1995: 93) of the 
social.  In this view, ‘ontic’ social relations and schemas which may appear superficially 
settled and permanent are actually constituted provisionally, and moment by moment, from 
their unfolding relationship with the ‘ontological’: an invisible but limitless ‘open universe’ 
of possibility comprised of Laclau’s underlying, immanent grammars. A major research 
challenge associated with this approach is to recognise how this ‘ontological’ register may be 
significant in shaping the ‘ontic’ register - since the ontological is not directly available to the 
researcher in an empirical sense. 
To address this challenge, our analysis makes use of a framework developed by 
students of Laclau: Glynos and Howarth’s (2007, 2008) Logics of critical explanation 
(hereafter Logics) in which the ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’ registers are juxtaposed dialectically 
(Laclau, 2000: 58). The framework facilitates consideration of what may be happening in 
each of these registers, and guides analysis of the possible socially generative relationship 
between the two: a relationship which animates Laclau’s ‘structural undecidability’. At the 
heart of the ontological-ontic dialectic is actors’ ongoing affective identification with 
practices, and their associated behaviour in reproducing, defending, or challenging these, 
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which constitutes this undecidable ‘trace of contingency within the structure’ (Laclau, 1993: 
535). Drawing attention to this ‘trace’ of ontological contingency is an important analytical 
undertaking, since although the various manifestations of power within the ontic register are 
more or less identifiable to the researcher (Lukes, 1974), their ontological contingency 
remains unseen and unacknowledged; social configurations thus may appear more self-
evident and stable than really they are. 
An affect-based ontology of practice, guided by a Laclauian framework, exposes this 
underlying ontological contingency of power relations.  The framework shows how social 
relations are immanently conditioned by actors’ affective states and associated identifications 
and dis-identifications – and thus attends to the mutually constitutive, and analytically 
revealing, relationship between affect and power in organisational practice.  Our study adds 
to a nascent body of work that has adopted Logics to inform empirical analysis (e.g. 
Wagenaar, 2011; West, 2011; Glynos, Klimecki and Willmott, 2012; Glynos, Speed and 
West, 2014). 
In the following section of the paper, we locate our analysis within practice-based 
studies and research on affect. We then outline Glynos and Howarth’s (2007, 2008) Logics 
approach in which an affective ontology is combined with an attentiveness to unfolding 
power relations in organisational practice. The framework incorporates psychoanalytic 
insights to highlight the potency of affectively-charged fantasies in the animation of social 
practices. In the third section, we analyse two episodes drawn from a study of Board 
interactions in an IT consulting firm, Associates.  
We conclude that an affect-based ontology of practice holds a number of potentially 
radical implications for social/organizational theoretical development. Notably, it exposes 
shortcomings in established forms of analysis that operate solely on the ontic register – such 
as those that rely upon ‘agency/structure’ and/or ‘micro/meso/macro’ distinctions. To address 
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these shortcomings, it proposes recasting such analyses within a more central, generative 
tension between ontic and ontological registers.  Such a re-casting, we claim, will allow 
researchers to better attend to the incompleteness as well as the mutual constitution of 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’, as well as to a ‘politics of affect’. 
Locating and orienting our research  
The literature addressing aspects of affect is extensive, so we rely here upon a number of 
recent reviews, the most salient of which, for our purposes, are Brief and Weiss (2002), 
Fineman (1993), Elfenbein (2007), Schmidt and Gibson (2010), Simpson and Marshall 
(2010), and Voronov and Vince (2012). Their shared assessment is that, as a consequence of 
the dominance of variants of rationalism, affect has generally tended to be marginalized in 
social scientific analysis, including management and organization studies (for recent 
discussions, see Collins and Munro, 2010; Hynes, 2013). In this inauspicious context, the 
challenge is to appreciate how, as Barbalet (2001: 187, emphasis added) puts it, with regard 
to the study of emotion as a form of affect: 
Emotion, as movement, is in that sense both external to the subject who experiences it 
and integral to their being as a consequence of their being moved by the feeling. 
Emotion has a source outside of the self in its relations with others and is internally 
experienced as a function of active being. It is through the subject's active exchanges 
with others, through interaction, that emotional experience is both stimulated in the 
actor and orientating of their conduct. 
We locate our study of affect within approaches that comprise the ‘practice turn’ (for 
reviews, see Corradi et al. (2008) and Nicolini (2012); see also Gherardi, 2009; Jansson, 
2013; King, 2009; Lave and Wenger, 1991). We distinguish core contributions to the practice 
canon by reference to their central commitment: first, to a process-based ontology of 
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continual ‘becoming’ (Thompson, 2011; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002); and second, to an 
epistemology that, by addressing the evolving accountability of practice (Rouse, 2001), 
attends to how behaviours, actions, and understandings of social acceptability (and thus 
contestability) are context-driven and become intelligible to selves and others ‘in flight’. As 
noted by Wetherell and others (e.g. Stenner, 2009; Walkerdine, 2009), practice ‘offers the 
best, bare bones, synthesising rubric for research on affect’ (Wetherell 2012: 11), where 
‘analyses of affective practices…will take as their subject how these practices are situated 
and connected’ (ibid.: 13).  As we shall show, our intersubjective (rather than subjective) 
conception of affect is similarly intertwined and relational, and encourages a view of practice 
as a medium and outcome of relations of power. Within the practice canon, the focus of our 
study is upon an ‘immanent logic of practice’ (Chia and MacKay 2007: 219, italics omitted) 
whereby ‘unconscious social forces shape and direct human intentions and actions’ (ibid.: 
232).  This conception of practice owes much to the immanence of Heidegger’s Dasein 
(which includes affective disposition as a core component) in its focus on how, 
unconsciously, ‘cultural transmissions, socialization, institutionalization, disciplinary 
regimes, etc., play a crucial role in shaping an actor’s modus operandi’ (ibid.: 232, original 
italics).  Narrowing our focus further still, we depart from Chia and Mackay (ibid.) in our 
interest in the ‘psychosocial texture’ (Wetherell 2012: 2) of this immanent logic, entailing a 
more encompassing conception of affect as ‘a philosophy of force, becoming, potential, 
encounter and difference’ that has ‘influence, intensity and impact’ (ibid.: 3), where affect is 
defined as ‘embodied meaning-making’ (ibid.: 4).  Such a conception is distinguishable from 
‘psychological’ approaches, which are typically more concerned with extracting affective 
states (specific moods and emotions) from their social context.  
In studying the psychosocial texture of this immanent logic of practice, we locate our 
study within the NW quadrant of Sieben and Wettergren’s (2010) ‘compass’ for 
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understanding the landscape of affect studies.  This quadrant combines the critical, post-
functionalist aim of politicising, rather then maintaining, existing relations, with a 
local/emergent approach that seeks to surface and illuminate dynamics of practice without 
being methodologically preoccupied with replicability or generalizability. The overriding 
concern of scholarship in this quadrant is with exploring the linkages between the ‘power-
knowledge connection’ and the ‘embodiment’ of emotion (Sieben 2007: 572). 
Logics as a conceptual framework  
Social, political, and fantasmatic logics 
In addressing the tricky issue of researching and conveying others’ affective states - a 
challenge which is perhaps most obvious in the study of ‘atmospheres’ (Anderson 2009) – in 
a way that is also attentive to the social situatedness of those states, we deploy Glynos and 
Howarth’s (2008) Logics framework.  Logics combines a focus on discourse, in the ontic 
register, with a Lacanian attentiveness to affective dynamics in the ontological register that is 
indebted to Lacanian psychoanalysis (Fotaki et al. 2012; see also Žĭzek, 1989; Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985; Cederström and Spicer, 2013). Consistent with our affect-based ontology, 
Glynos and Howarth argue that the reproduction or transformation of social practices arises 
from the operation of three interweaving logics - social, political and fantasmatic - which 
govern the configuration of the socially generative relationships between discourse and 
affect.  
Social logics rationalize and reproduce the status quo. Political logics, in contrast, 
operate to establish new practices as well as to transform practices in the face of the 
naturalizing effects of prevailing social logics. Most importantly for our analysis, fantasmatic 
logics provide the motivational force for social and political logics through affective 
identification with, and investment in, particular grammars/discourse. In supplying the 
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psychosocial texture animating actors’ affective motivations - either to reproduce (social 
logics) or to disrupt (political logics) the prevailing order - fantasmatic logics frame and 
mediate actors’ identification, and resulting mode (or immanent logic) of engagement, with 
unfolding practice.   
Fantasmatic logics mediate actors’ mode of engagement 
Unlike other framings of affective self-identification, such as those devised by Bourdieu (e.g. 
1977) and Giddens (e.g. 1984), the Logics framework’s affect-based ontology of practice (see 
Kemp, 2010; Thompson, 2012) accords central importance to the operation of this third, 
fantasmatic, logic. For researchers, this change in orientation means a shift from examining 
specific (ontic) ‘practices’ towards a focal attentiveness to actors’ (ontological) mode of 
engagement: how actors reproduce or challenge social relations to the degree that they 
become affectively invested in, or distanced from, them (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008).  In 
contrast, ‘agency’ and ‘structure’, which are the focal elements in contemporary social 
analysis, are considered to be secondary (ontic) configurations that emerge from this mode of 
engagement.  
In theorising the mode of engagement, Glynos and Howarth (2007) adopt a Lacanian 
view of fantasmatic logics as deriving from libidinally felt motivation directed towards 
jouissance: a form of enjoyment-in-anticipation, the object of which can never be obtained:  
‘jouissance does not exist, it is impossible, but it produces a number of traumatic effects’ 
(Žĭzek 1989: 164). These ‘effects’ manifest via fantasy: actors’ subscription to identifications 
that ‘paper over’ the contingency of social life (Lok and Willmott, 2013), and 
distract/compensate for the (traumatic) unattainability of jouissance. In short, in accounting 
for the ‘grip’ of identity on the ‘vector’ of possible identifications (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 
2008: 11; see also Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008) fantasy mediates between affective 
motivation and socio-political reality, via the mode of engagement (Glynos and Stavrakakis, 
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2008: 8; see also Frosh, 2002). 
 From a critical perspective, subjects’ willingness to conform with ideologies and 
identities with which they are confronted depends on the extent to which jouissance 
associated with fantasies encourages them to disregard their underlying 
contingency/unattainability. To the extent that this occurs, ‘domination…differs from [mere] 
authority and oppression in that agents are complicit in their acceptance of structures and 
practices that from the critic’s point of view can be judged illegitimate or unjust’ (Glynos 
2010: 323) – leading potentially to self-exploitation (e.g. Costas and Fleming 2009). 
Using dimensions of the Logics to study psychosocial configurations  
Drawing together the discussion of Logics, the horizontal dimension in Figure 1 is concerned 
with how ‘fantasmatic dynamics’ mediate ‘ethical and ideological forms of subjectivity’ 
(Ekman 2013: 1161, original italics); and the vertical dimension addresses the social 
‘consequences’ of this unfolding process (though they effectively comprise two dimensions 
of the same phenomenon).  Taking each in turn, the horizontal (‘naturalization’) axis 
addresses the differential ways in which actors experience and address contingency: ‘the 
ideological logic involves a subject struggling with competing hyper-intense fantasies, 
whereas the ethical logic involves a subject struggling with her or his tendency to fantasize at 
all’ (Glynos, 2008: 291, in Ekman, ibid. 1165) because s/he recognises the underlying 
contingency/contestibility of these identifications, and thus resists ‘buying in’ to them. 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
The vertical (‘contestation’) axis addresses the social ‘consequences’ of this process, in 
terms of maintaining and/or transforming social practices. At the ‘social’ pole, practices are 
reproduced with the minimum of contestation. At the ‘political’ pole however, practices are 
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in the process of being instituted or challenged. As will become evident, the strongest 
affinities are between the ethical-political (disinvestment-challenge) poles, and also between 
the ideological-social (investment-acquiescence) poles. In particular, by underscoring the 
ontological contingency of local (ontic) practices that may otherwise appear ideologically 
self-evident or normative, the ‘ethical’ pole provides the conditions of possibility of critique.  
For the researcher, consideration of both psychoanalytical (naturalisation) and social 
(contestation) dimensions together affords analysis of psychosocial configurations, or 
articulations – and thus allows explicit analytical consideration of the affective component of 
social practice: of ‘the closure of subjective identification’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 198).  
In so doing, such analysis affords (political) consideration of the affective vulnerabilities to 
which subjects expose themselves through their fantasmatic dynamics. 
Applying the logics 
Having the benefit of, but also departing from, previous attempts to operationalize the Logics 
framework (e.g. Clarke, 2011; Ekman, 2013; Holtzman, 2013), we now demonstrate its 
relevance for the empirical study of affect in the social structuring of practice. Consideration 
of the naturalization and contestation dimensions together can, we will suggest, illuminate the 
mediating operation of (affectively-felt) fantasmatic logics on both social logics 
(reproduction) and political logics (institution/transformation) (see Figure 2). 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
Working round Figure 2, subjects’ fantasmatic identifications can obscure the 
contingency of social life (left side of Figure 2); or, to the extent that people are less 
affectively invested in, and therefore less subject to these identifications, there is greater 
openness to, and awareness of, the underlying contingency/contestability of social relations 
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(right side of Figure 2). In this regard, actors are either more favourably placed to act in ways 
that challenge those relations, or they are actively quiescent in their reproduction (they don’t 
‘buy in’, but they don’t challenge, either).  Conversely, to the extent that subjects are 
affectively invested in, and subject to, fantasmatic identifications, awareness of the 
contingency/contestability of normative relations of power is less likely, and so there is a 
greater propensity passively to reproduce those relations. Alternatively, actors may attempt to 
supplant established relations with another set of relations in which they are affectively 
invested.  
Our analysis works outwards, identifying actors’ (mediating) affective fantasmatic 
logics which we link to social and political logics along the two dimensions discussed above. 
Situated within our affect-based ontology of practice, the Logics framework facilitates 
analysis of how the conversations reported in fragments of our transcript presented below 
develop through several identifiable, if temporary, configurations of affectively-mediated 
logics.   
Research context 
Shared narratives at Associates: Will, Andy, and the researcher 
The site of the research is a well-established mid-sized Metropolis-based consulting company 
which we call Associates (a pseudonym). At the time of the research, conducted in 2010, the 
company had been undergoing internal restructuring, as well as developing new propositions 
and capabilities in response to the post-2008 economic downturn. Will, Andy (the names are 
pseudonyms), and one of the authors (hereafter ‘the Researcher’) were all directors of the 
company, and had been attending Board meetings together since 2005.  Notes were taken, by 
the researcher, on interactions between Will and Andy which occurred during three monthly 
Board meetings of during August-November 2010, of which two interactions are presented 
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here. Due to the shared history between all three individuals, the unfolding meaning for the 
participants of the two episodes is only partially intelligible in the present tense as ‘[t]ime 
does not break for us into tiny segments.  Our duration is a continuous gnawing of the past 
into the present where the present is infused with a burden of the past that does not pass, does 
not ever escape us’ (Middleton and Brown 2005: 224). 
The affective dynamics between Will, Andy and the Researcher (who has 20 years’ 
immersion in Associates) are thus fundamentally relational, and historically-inflected. In 
Logics terms, all three were fantasmatically invested in the preservation of a strongly 
discernible self-identity that appeared partly defined, or reaffirmed, in their interactions with 
the others. As the empirical episodes show, the fantasmatic logics of the actors’ respective 
self-investments mediated their mode of engagement with the social and political logics with 
which they confronted one other. Will and the Researcher had worked for the Company since 
its startup days. Andy, in contrast, had gained experience working in a larger consulting 
organization before joining Associates more recently. To provide additional details of Will 
and Andy’s backgrounds is neither morally defensible nor practically relevant as this might 
allow their identification. 
What, then, of how Will, Andy, and the Researcher conceived of themselves? Based on 
years of experience of interactions with Will and Andy, we believe that the following terms 
speak to Will’s self-identity in the context of Associates: ‘leader, ‘considerate’, ‘straight 
talking’, and ‘people person’; those describing Andy’s self-identity include ‘leader’ but also 
‘ambitious’, ‘corporate’, and ‘professional’; and those describing the Researcher’s self-
identity include ‘mediator’, ‘analytical’, and ‘reticent’.  Taken together, Andy’s self-
identifications might be collectively termed ‘managerialist’, Will’s might be termed 
‘empathetic’, and the Researcher’s ‘non-committal’ in the sense that he often tried to avoid 
emotional subscription to either Will’s or Andy’s generally more dominant schemas (in 
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Logics terms, it could be said that the Researcher tried semi-consciously to locate himself in 
the SE quadrant in Figure 2).  
Further, all three displayed some awareness of the others’ self-identifications, which 
appeared to have influenced the evolution of their own respective self-identities, as well as 
group identity over the years, in a way that is only historically, and relationally, intelligible. 
Within the context of Associates, the affective politics between Will, Andy, and the 
Researcher had been co-created, over time, in a manner that reflects a progressive 
‘intertwining of subjectivities’ between ourselves and others as ‘we observe their gestures, 
facial expressions, their rising and dampening of affect and then model, intuit and re-run their 
intentions and psychological states’ (Wetherell 2012: 88). In our analysis, we will attempt to 
‘model, intuit and re-run’ this fundamental affective relationality, describing a ‘pairing of 
affective positions, normative turn and counter-turn, and processes of context-making for 
affective relational moves’ (ibid.: 87). 
Interpreting shared narratives: Collection and analysis of data 
The method of data collection was covert (Goffman, 1968; Jorgensen, 1989) so as to 
minimise the researcher’s influence on the ‘natural’ unfolding of the interactions. The ethics 
of such covert participant observation have been questioned but also selectively defended (eg. 
Herrera, 1999; Lugosi, 2006; Miller 2001), with some experienced ethnographers conceding 
that all fieldwork relationships invariably involve some covertness (e.g. Grills 1998). In the 
present study, the texts and supporting analysis were subsequently shared with relevant 
members of Associates, and consent to publication obtained. Despite this acceptance (or 
member ‘validation’), our analysis doubtless harbours selective attentiveness to, and 
interpretation of, the episodes. Our narrative is necessarily a perspective-dependent version of 
‘the truth’, but one whose frame of reference we have endeavoured to make explicit. 
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If Adler and Adler’s (1987) advice that data collection continues until one can ‘act as a 
native’, then saturation has resulted from the Researcher’s extended period of immersion. 
Such immersion is especially valuable for analysis where close familiarity with subjects’ 
emotional orientations is required. Specifically, and with regard to the approach advanced 
above and applied here, it is vital to have an in-depth and longitudinal appreciation of the 
affectivity of fantasmatic logics in relation to the social logics and political logics enacted in 
the research context. We readily acknowledge that the only empirical ‘evidence’ 
underpinning our attributions exists in the ontic, rather than ontological, register, which is 
never empirically ‘available’ in complete form; we have thus been careful to separate the two 
registers in our presentation of the data.   
Our appeal to the value of ‘immersion’, the cri de coeur of all participant researchers, 
of course begs the question of any researcher’s access to other peoples’ emotions. To address 
this tricky issue, we refer to Sturdy’s (2003) consideration of research on emotion where he 
contends that ‘given some cultural understanding of the immediate social context, we can 
necessarily offer a valid or plausible interpretation of sentiments through observation’; and he 
further argues that ‘immediate and biographical history…may provide insight into the 
emotional context and process’ (2003: 86-7).  An ability to ‘read’ and evaluate affect in the 
form of others’ emotions is, on this interpretation, a basic social competency for 
organizational practice (as demonstrated in its breach), in which working familiarity with the 
discursive practice through which emotions are constituted is substituted for the more 
traditional concern with elusive ‘inner feelings’.   
This methodological approach resonates strongly with the view that: 
The emotionality of narrative is more than the location of certain emotion words and 
phrases. It includes the relationship between the words, the metaphors used… and the 
sense of cadence, hesitation and silences detectable in the structure of the text or 
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presentation (tape recording, video or observations). The researcher’s challenge is 
sensitively to ‘read’ the emotional form and context of the text, while accentuating what 
is important for the particular inquiry. In doing so, the researcher is inevitably a part of 
the process, drawing upon emotion discourses ‘in their head’. Such reflexivity is a 
feature of emotion knowing (Fineman, 2004: 733). 
In this sense, what is attempted by the Researcher below is an abbreviated ‘confessional 
tale’ (Van Maanen 1988): a form of ‘[m]ethodological reflexivity, as expressed in 
confessional ethnography, [which] transforms the self by converting it to a new way of 
thinking and acting and writing – that way being the way of introspective reflection’ 
(Webster 2008) that is sensitive to the ‘relationships’ to which Fineman (2004) refers. 
 
Empirical material 
Two episodes from the Board meetings are presented, and then analysed below. Each was 
selected for its relatively self-contained and accessible (e.g. jargon-free) nature, and both are 
sufficiently brief to allow their presentation within the space limitations of a journal article. 
Our intention in analysing the two episodes is to demonstrate the main theoretical proposition 
(affect-based ontology) by applying the Logics approach to analyse mundane episodes of 
organizational work. Such an aim is consistent with an acknowledgment that qualitative case 
studies ‘typically ha[ve] more relevance to theoretical generalisation, which involves 
“suggesting new interpretations and concepts or re-examining earlier concepts or 
interpretations in new and innovative ways”’ (Orum et al., 1991: 13). Our analysis of the 
episodes strives for ‘naturalistic generalisability’ (Stake 1978), at least insofar as its 
aspiration is to resonate with our readers’ own sensemaking.  
Engaging with the empirical material 
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Our analysis examines two exchanges between Will and Andy at which the Researcher was 
present, identified as Episodes 1 and 2 in two tables.  The use of a tabular format more 
readily permits the exchanges to be read vertically, in ‘pure’ form as they occurred, as well as 
horizontally, in dialogue with our suggested configuration of Logics, whilst maintaining a 
clear separation between the two. The left hand column sets out the exchanges as they were 
recorded in the Researcher’s field notes.  The notes comprise the exchanges as they were 
spoken, and emotional cues that were observed [square brackets], together with observations 
about ‘atmospheres’ that were affectively experienced by the Researcher (round brackets). 
These observations take the form of single adjectives, in brackets in the left hand column of 
the Table for each episode, that describe how the room felt to the Researcher in a way that 
parallels others’ descriptions of affective ‘atmospheres’ conceived inter alia as ‘spatially 
discharged, quasi-objective feelings’ (Böhme, 2006: 16), ‘collective affects’ (Anderson, 
2009: 78), or contagious affect (Thrift, 2008). These observations may be casually termed 
‘subjective’, but consistent with the conceptual framing of this paper, they are arguably inter-
subjective in their embodied sociality. 
The right hand column locates our analysis within the Logics framework: it offers 
‘snapshots’ of the different configurations of the three logics through which we argue that the 
dialogue passes as it unfolds.  Finally, the analysis that follows each Episode has been written 
by the Researcher, and the narrative therefore moves into the first person where it has a more 
confessional style.  This analytical approach, we suggest, offers a novel and promising, 
affect-attentive way to explicate the dynamics of everyday practices of organizing.   
 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT EPISODE 1 HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
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Episode 1: Organizational Structure 
Applying the Logics framework, the above episode is seen to move through several 
psychosocial articulations.  In the first, ‘Regard of contingency: knowing challenge 
(invocation of political logic)’, there is a configuration of political and ethical dimensions 
(recalling Figure 2) as Andy introduces the notion of stronger governance structures. This is 
an innovation that the Researcher believes Andy anticipates will be difficult, since it 
challenges the status quo (political logic) and invokes a long-standing difference, where 
Andy seeks more formality, and Will seeks informality.  ‘Company Handbook’ is therefore a 
loaded phrase; its invocation creates a tension in the room that we all feel strongly.  Such a 
tension is intelligible as an ‘intention movement’ (Stern 2004).  Such movements are 
not completed relational moves but mere beginnings of recognisable affective patterns.  
These seem like the moments preceding lightning strikes when sophisticated still 
photography shows threads of electrical connection beginning to manifest with the 
tallest objects in the field, before the strike completes the connection (Wetherell 2012: 
87). 
 
There is a tense feeling in the room, as Andy’s introduction of the ‘Company 
Handbook’ [Andy 1] immediately invokes a historically-inflected, affective positioning: a 
specific configuration of power relations over which Andy has discursive mastery.  
Fantasmatically, my everyday, operational reading of Andy is that he is invested in a more 
corporate self-image in which ‘moral’ signifiers like governance structures make him feel 
confident/in control, whereas Will is invested in the reverse – and the apparent bipolarity of 
this dynamic may be exacerbated by my own (felt and perceived) passivity. In turn, it may be 
that I am invested fantasmatically in the notion of being a ‘moderate’ in relation to Will and 
Andy’s ‘excessive posturing’.  For all three of us, these characterisations are historically-
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forged and long-acknowledged, and this tripartite ‘shape’ colours the way in which we are 
motivated to react, and experience.  I suggest that our motivations in each case arise from our 
respective pursuit of jouissance, in which each of us wants to ‘feel good’: secure, and 
confident, about our positioning within this tripartite dynamic – when the opposite is 
normally the case.  Re-visiting this sequence, and the ‘tense’ note in brackets, is to 
reconstitute a keen relationality: a viscerally-experienced patterning of mutual insecurity: of 
discursive move and counter-move in which I often occupied the position of  despairing 
bystander. 
In the second articulation, ‘Regard of contingency: attempt to reproduce status quo 
(invocation of social logic)’, a single sound [Will 1] from Will is sufficient to convey rich 
meaning to myself and Andy: his noncommittal ‘Mmmmmm’ response indicates that he is 
listening, that Andy may have a point (i.e. that Will’s own position may be contingent) but 
does not agree anyway (attempt to reproduce status quo). Fantasmatically, Will appears 
emotionally invested in a ‘straight-talking’ and ‘reasonable’ self-image, which pits him 
against Andy’s bid to position the Company Handbook as a self-evidently obvious 
improvement (in Will’s view, such structures are poor substitutes for ‘getting in a room and 
sorting things out face to face’) – motivating him to invoke a social logic (reproduction of 
existing relations).  
All three of us are highly sensitive to topics, such as this, that are emblematic of, and 
thus trigger, an historically-understood conflict: the psychodynamics of our interaction are 
always bound up with the ‘tinderbox’ of our mutual discursive patterning. In this articulation, 
Will’s positioning combines social and ethical dimensions of the Logics, where he is 
‘ethically aware’ of Andy’s discursive move, but is reserving his position for now.  Will’s 
‘Mmmmmm’ indicates that he is feeling frustrated at the direction this conversation may be 
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about to take – at the likely effect that his ‘regard of contingency’ is likely to have on Andy 
in a moment’s time – even as he utters the sound. 
Sure enough, in the third articulation - Disregard of contingency: semi-conscious 
identification/challenge (defence of political logic) - Will’s noncommittal response ignites 
feelings of frustration and hostility in Andy (and a similarly frustrated sense of ‘been-here-
before’ in myself – as indicated by the margin note ‘aarrgghhhh’).  Andy moves to a 
political/ideological configuration of dimensions, since fantasmatically his self-image seems 
bound up with his role as professional innovator, with experience of professional best 
practice, gained prior to joining Associates, that neither Will nor I possess (whilst allowing 
that this may be a partial reflection of a certain insecurity on my own part in this regard).  In 
the terms used here, it appears to me strongly that the notion of being professionally ‘in 
control’ is a source of jouissance for Andy.  Reflection on this encounter usually reconstitutes 
feelings of sympathy I felt at the time for Andy, because he often appeared less aware of 
these dynamics than Will – i.e. he seemed to operate more often than Will towards the 
‘ideological’ pole of the ‘naturalization’ axis – with an attendant vulnerability when the 
contingency of schemas with which he identified came under challenge.   
My reading of Andy’s ‘sigh’, and related vocal tone in [Andy 2] is that he is aware of 
the significance of this particular skirmish both for his own self-esteem and for the deeply 
embedded power relations between him and Will (i.e. there is an air of resignation to some 
inevitability about their interaction). Recalling that Andy has mastery of this particular 
‘grammar’, discursive closure around the signifiers of ‘good governance’ represented by the 
Handbook offers him the prospect of ontological security.  However, the frustrated 
demeanour may betray an awareness that satisfaction of this ‘lack’ in the form of ‘ontic 
closure’ – turning this contingency into local reality - is contingent upon Will’s ethical value-
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choice, as well as his own – in a manner recalling Žĭzek’s comment, earlier, about the trauma 
associated with the unachievability of jouissance. 
Will’s response in the fourth articulation - Disregard of contingency: semi-conscious 
identification/challenge (defence of social logic) – appears to reinforce the precariousness of 
Andy’s position. Will responds [Will 2] to Andy’s sigh with a strained, terse tone of voice 
(both seem to strive to maintain neutral body language), betraying some semi-conscious 
awareness that there is more at stake than the subject of this particular exchange - an 
awareness which mirrors that of Andy, and certainly my own (indeed, the three are 
relationally constituted).  Will now justifies his position and makes clear why he disagrees 
with Andy (‘ideological’ and ‘political’ dimensions), as he shores up his persona as a ‘people 
person’.  He appeals to an alternative discursive grammar: ‘that magic’ (Associate’s 
traditionally friendly culture), and thus the self-evidence of not ‘throw(ing) the baby out with 
the bathwater’.  As an observer who shares Will and Andy’s historically-established affective 
patterning and ‘embodied meaning-making’ (Wetherell, ibid.) is evident to me from the 
simmering atmosphere in the room that this skirmish has become much more about Will and 
Andy’s ‘empathetic’ vs ‘managerialist’ positioning, than any comparatively innocuous debate 
regarding the relative efficacy of a Corporate Handbook. 
Finally, by the fifth articulation - Regard of contingency: knowing challenge (defence of 
political logic) - the studiedly neutral body language maintained thus far by both Will and 
Andy slips as the (affective) atmosphere in the room becomes openly hostile, and Andy, 
visibly exasperated, knocks back Will’s challenge [Andy 3], before tailing off with a 
theatrical sigh of frustration.  As my notes record, the room feels ‘unfriendly’ – a relationally 
affective dynamic – as we appeared locked into (yet another) stalemate, and I felt like 
leaving.  It seems to me that Andy is representing his challenge to the status quo as no more 
than (self evident) ‘best practice’: a ‘discursive grammar’ that denies its own contingency, 
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whilst knowingly challenging Will’s assertion that he is proposing to swamp people with 
rulebooks.   
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT EPISODE 2 HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
Episode 2: More sharing of client contacts 
Applying the Logics framework this time to Episode 2, in the first articulation - Disregard of 
contingency: semi-conscious identification/challenge (invocation of political logic) - the 
psychodynamics of Andy and Will’s interaction appear conditioned once again by their 
mutual fantasmatic investment in the ‘tinderbox’ of a relationally-felt rivalry.  Such rivalry 
manifested, as usual, in a destructive compulsion towards conflict, as each pursued 
jouissance in the form of the unattainable ontological security of mastery over the other. In 
this exchange, Andy challenges how contacts are normally used [Andy 4] – that is, in ways 
that are sub-optimal from his standpoint – and conjures up a fantasy of the dire consequences 
of maintaining the status quo, presented as normative outcome (‘political’ and ‘ideological’ 
dimensions of the Logics). He appears genuinely to believe that Associate’s use of contacts is 
sub-optimal (disregard of contingency) – rather than just one of several, equally contingent, 
value choices.  In terms of my own affective involvement, my ‘been-here-before/expectant’ 
notes indicate a sense of expectancy of re-opening old wounds.  This ‘re-opening’ occurred 
frequently during meetings between the three of us. Revisiting the empirical material, it is 
inconceivable to me that this affective sense was not shared by all of us, because its shared 
nature was what lent it its intensity. 
In the terms advanced here, Andy appears to be unaware of what I read, via the Logics, 
as his own fantasmatic investment in the pursuit of jouissance, or ontological security, that 
underlies his proposal of ‘leveraging our contacts better’; Andy would frequently make 
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suggestions, such as this, based in a ‘managerial’ approach to administrative control through 
which, as previously noted, he appeared to gain in confidence and a sense of ascendancy. 
However, if Andy is relatively unaware of the ontological contingency of the ontic schema he 
is advancing, I am confident that he is semi-aware that this subject touches on the historical, 
discursive web of relations that has built up between him and Will in which they/we are 
both/all emotionally invested, and that as a result, his suggestion is unlikely to go uncontested 
(political logic).  
In the second articulation - Disregard of contingency: semi-conscious 
identification/challenge (invocation of social logic) - Will appears to sense an attempt in the 
previous articulation by Andy [Andy 4] to normalise social relations around some kind of 
structured communication regime (‘leveraging our contacts across the company’) over which 
Andy will have control. With a grim relish, Will now appears [Will 3] to ‘toy’ with Andy.  
This is apparent from his ‘mischievous’ tone of voice, together with his assessment that, in 
making his ostensibly innocuous suggestion, Andy is proposing that ‘people are just going to 
give up their client relationships’. This is exactly the sort of escalatory behaviour that I would 
occasionally tell Will or Andy was ‘a bit unnecessary’ (usually on a one to one basis, often 
after a disagreement between them). 
Although Will probably believes in his own discursively stated position (disregard of 
contingency), my reading is that Will’s response is motivated as much by self-image as by 
any vigorous opposition to ‘leveraging contacts’ per se. Within the framework advanced 
here, Will is motivated in this exchange by the need to ‘paper over the cracks’ of his own 
ontological contingency and construct/reinforce his own self-image ontically (in this 
instance) as a ‘people person’ by ‘explaining’ to Andy how people are likely to behave ‘in 
reality’ (based, perhaps, on his own superior empathy: semi-conscious identification) – and 
casting Andy in an opposing, emotionally unintelligent, role.  Fantasmatic motivation 
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towards self-realisation as a ‘people person’ appears to inflect Will’s readiness to quickly 
broaden the debate, which escalates rapidly from Andy’s suggestion about ‘working 
together’, to a barely disguised claim about relative empathy.  Such motivation – jouissance – 
is apparent to me because there appears to be more going on than a simple discursive 
argument – for which Will’s pursuit of a secure self-image is the most intuitive explanation. 
In response, Andy’s ‘dogged’ advancement of the need for ‘more robust pipeline 
management’ [Andy 5] in the third articulation - Disregard of contingency: semi-conscious 
identification/challenge (defence of political logic) - appears to me akin to a fantasmatic 
‘battening down of hatches’ in response to what Andy will, in my view, inevitably interpret 
as Will’s [Will 3] implied identification of him as a bloodless managerialist whom people 
will not obey simply ‘because they’ve been told to’ (i.e. by Andy).  Once again, Andy’s 
strategy is to invoke ideologically normative ‘best practice’ (see previous excerpt) in the form 
of the ‘pipeline’, etc. (‘ideological’ and ‘social’ dimensions).  Visible in Andy’s dogged 
adherence to the ‘grammar’ of his more structured approach to organizational management, 
and associated ascendancy, is once again a strength of emotion that transcends the mere 
(cognitive) articulation of a minor difference in position.  As a regular participant in such 
exchanges, it seems to me that neither Andy or Will is fully affectively emancipated from 
their respective discursive identifications: in the terms advanced here, their affectively-driven 
needs for fantasmatic identification leads each to disregard the contingency inherent in their 
respective positions.  It is my feeling that such exchanges contain an insecure, and perhaps 
distinctively masculine, posturing element that is ‘all about them’, and not necessarily about 
Associates, that triggers my own feelings of ‘hardening cynicism’.   
The final articulation - Regard of contingency: knowing challenge (defence of social 
logic)- implies that the hardening cynicism I feel is shared (co-created?) with at least Will.  
This is my intuitive reading of the situation, because Will responds with a flat rebuttal.  In our 
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analysis, the rebuttal is fantasmatically driven, because it is underpinned with the logic of his 
self-identification as ‘straight talking’ and ‘reasonable’ (he can ‘just tell it like it is, based on 
his insights as a ‘people person’).  The outcome is an underlining of what, from Will’s point 
of view, is the contingency of Andy’s assertion of self-evidence (‘ethical’ and ‘political’ 
dimensions).  Temporary ‘ontic closure’ is achieved, with the preservation of the social logic 
of status quo – but at the expense of cordiality. The existing political settlement has been 
reproduced – for now.   
What of my own fantasmatic identification?  Building on the confessional observations 
thus far, and attempting an ethical reflexivity in the SE quadrant of Figure 2, it seems to me 
that my own jouissance is bound up in some way with my ability to work within Associates 
and yet maintain my own independence: to be ‘in it but not of it’. Whilst such a ‘squaring of 
the circle’ is clearly as impossible for me as discursive mastery of the Other is for Will and 
Andy, I sense that it forms an ulterior source of motivation that pre-positions me no less than 
theirs: in this sense, I am no more ‘in control’ during these exchanges than they are. 
Discussion 
Shifting analytical focus from ‘ontic’ to ‘ontological’ in practice studies 
In analyses of practice, the significance of affect, in the form of emotions, feelings and 
moods, tends to be backgrounded. Even those who have acknowledged the orienting role of 
affect in providing practice with a ‘sense of direction’ (Shotter, 2011: 6) rarely analyse 
practice from within an affectively-informed, critical ontology (see Clough, 2007). To 
counteract this relative neglect, we have shown the relevance of employing an affect-based 
ontology of practice in illuminating relational, emergent everyday ‘organizing’ (Czarniawska, 
2008).  Affect, we have suggested, is of central importance for understanding the animation 
and reproduction of practice - as illustrated by the detailed analysis of the episodes at 
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Associates in which we have shown how affect-saturated identifications and transient social 
‘settlements’ are accomplished within evolving, politically charged, social relations with 
social, political, ideological, and ethical dimensions along axes of naturalization and 
contestation. 
For the directors at Associates, moment-by-moment articulation of their world of 
mutual intelligibility involves (re)production of meaningful, but precarious, ‘settlements’ 
between these dimensions: in endorsements, ‘gentle testing/questioning’, outright challenges, 
ironic compliance with social structures, and so on. For researchers, understanding why such 
settlements occur, and are supplanted with others, requires engagement with an impelling 
dynamic between ostensibly firm ontic ‘structures’ and ontologically fluid, affectively 
charged ‘processes’ upon which the seeming firmness of the ontic register is contingent at all 
times: unfolding ‘practice’ comprises the generative tension between ontic and ontological 
registers. This dynamic arises from the irreducibility of the ontological to the ontic register, 
or as Laclau (2000: 81) puts it, ‘there is no logical transition from an unavoidable ethical 
[ontological] moment…to any particular [ontic] normative order. There is an ethical 
investment in particular normative orders, but no normative order which is, in and of itself, 
ethical’. 
In consequence, a particular issue for future consideration is our proposal of a 
fundamental shift in analytical focus within practice studies: from studying phenomena of the 
ontic register, to studying subjects’ mode of engagement within the ontological register, 
before ‘working outwards’ to consider its ontic consequences. It is actors’ mode of 
engagement with unfolding practices, rather than unfolding practices themselves, that 
constitutes the locus of social reproduction and/or transformation. With this shift comes a 
particular ethnographic challenge that is perhaps less common within practice studies that are 
principally concerned with the ‘ontic’: addressing the (ontological) intentions and 
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psychological states of others (recalling Wetherell, ibid.). Given the relational constitution of 
affect, researchers are likely to have to provide more confessional accounts of their own 
affective intertwining with their research subjects: deploying an affect-based ontology to 
study social practices invites the incorporation of researchers’ own emotions, feelings and 
moods into the study of organizing; research may need to become more longitudinal as a 
result.  We suggest that our own, initial attempt to deploy an affect-based ontology to venture 
‘ontological explanations for ontic phenomena’ is at best incomplete; and so, it may usefully 
stimulate the generation of better, more mature conceptual frameworks within which to study 
subjects’ modes of engagement. 
Towards a politics of affect 
Unpacking social practices requires a critical engagement with the visceral operation of 
power within organisations, including actors’ own complicity in reproducing the relations 
through which they are dominated and oppressed – a characteristic that we foregrounded in 
our analysis of Associates. A particular feature of an affect-based ontology, visible 
throughout the paper, is a foregrounding of the way in which actors’ historical immersion in 
power relations conditions their self-identifications.  Within the psychoanalytically-informed 
analysis advanced here, such immersion combines with actors’ pursuit of an ultimately 
unattainable jouissance to offer a (for them) compelling, often destructive motivation for 
behaving in the way that they do.  Thus for Will, fantasmatic pursuit of jouissance, or 
ontological security, entailed fantasmatic subscription to an identity as a ‘people-person’; for 
Andy, it was pursuit of peer recognition as a ‘professional’; for the Researcher, it was an 
ability to remain ‘semi-detached’ from (better than?) the posturing at Associates.  
Since identification constitutes a form of domination to the extent that actors are 
affectively complicit in their own acquiescence, actors’ increased awareness of their self-
identifications with social structures and practices may thus hold emancipatory potential (Lok 
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and Willmott, 2013) – as well as offering some insulation from Žĭzek’s ‘traumatic effects’ 
when fantasy is ultimately unrealised. Bringing these observations together, we suggest that 
an analytical attentiveness to a ‘politics of affect’ – the mutually constitutive and analytically 
revealing relationship between affect and power in organising - may be a necessary corollary 
for an affective ontology of practice.  
Researchers seeking to study the politics of affect can call upon two particular strengths 
of the Logics framework as demonstrated here.  First, we have addressed the emergent, 
generative dialogue between ontological and ontic registers of unfolding practice - affording 
what we contend is a more rounded account of social reality informed by both registers.  In 
placing ‘contingency within the structure’ at the centre of such analysis, the precariousness 
(and thus ‘political’ contestability) of practices that we routinely reproduce, modify or 
transform, and take to be normal, is underlined. Second, our analysis has incorporated a 
motivational explanation for affective politics: the central role of fantasy offers a plausible 
account for the differential extents to which, as actors, we are dis/inclined to recognise the 
radical contingency (broader ontological instability) of ontic practices and choices in which 
we are implicated.  
For example, in their sedimentation of social reality, Will and Andy are seen to engage 
in fantasmatic appeals: to the self-evident good of ‘robust structures’; to the obvious good 
sense of not ‘swamping people with rulebooks’ (Andy 2; Will 2); to the clear need to 
‘leverage our contacts across the company’; and to ‘a robust pipeline management approach’ 
(Andy 4; Andy 5). These appeals, we have suggested, are made in the pursuit of political 
logics (proposals for change) as well as social logics (maintenance of the status quo). Such 
practices arise from affectively–driven identifications, derived from available moral 
grammars.  Ontically, the outcomes-in-process of Will and Andy’s interactions are the result 
of how each rallies ontologically around the ideological ‘standards’ with which he identifies.  
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For example, it might have been comparatively easy for Will to endorse - passively or 
actively - Andy’s appeals to ‘robust structures’, ‘leveraged contacts’, and ‘pipeline 
management’. Will would then be complicit in concealing the radical contingency of these 
ideas (bottom left quadrant of 3), were it not for his ongoing affective commitment to 
constituting his self-identity as ‘straight talking’ and a ‘people person’ – a commitment which 
results in him challenging the givenness of Andy’s standards.  It is arguable that a greater 
self-awareness of their mutual processes of subjection might have enabled both Will and 
Andy to reach a more empathetic accommodation - an insight of some practical potential in 
engendering greater mutual awareness between organisational actors. 
 
Conclusion 
In applying Logics to analyse empirical material, our study has contributed to remedying the 
‘poststructuralist methodological deficit’ identified by Zienkowski (2012: 504): that is, a 
comparative lack of methodologies for studying relationally-conceived phenomena.  More 
specifically, we have sought to develop and apply a methodology for examining the centrality 
of affect in the animation of practice, with the anticipation that future studies will engage 
with it and build upon it. Through our empirical analysis, we proposed and applied a method 
for presenting and analysing detailed ethnographic material within a psychosocial, immanent 
logic of practice. Investigating affective contingency within the structure entails an analytical 
distinction between ontic ‘structures’ and ontological affective ‘processes’ upon which such 
structures remain contingent at all times. Specifically, we presented Episodes One and Two 
of the Associates data in tabular format that presents empirical material (‘Text’) in the ontic 
register alongside an interpretation of the ‘Configuration of social, political, and fantasmatic 
Logics’). We then offered a ‘confessional’ explanation of the underlying dynamics of 
unfolding practice in the ontological register. We believe this to be a productive way of 
 28 
displaying and unpacking the ontic/ontological dialectic within the Logics, but further 
exploration of these issues could usefully be undertaken in future research. Particular 
limitations of our research involve the inductive inference of ontological phenomena from 
ontic data; although we hope to have offered an open, and plausible, account of our analysis 
within a structured framework, we hope that others may seek to improve on our preliminary 
attempt. 
Our affect-based ontology of practice, and associated methodology, led us to two 
significant observations which, we suggest, merit further consideration within the practice-
based research community.  First, practice-based research which is presently hinged around 
study of the structure/agency relationship should instead be embedded in, and oriented by, the 
generative dynamic between the ontic and the ontological, as addressed here.  Whilst we have 
endeavoured to unpack some of the more immediate implications of such a shift, we expect 
that this may be only the beginning.  Second, an affectively-located analysis of motivation 
invites a particularly nuanced appreciation of the operation of power within organisational 
practice, in which ethical actors may be both protagonists as well as complicit subjects.  Such 
an appreciation offers an opportunity to deepen existing theories of self-regulation, such as 
governmentality (e.g. Foucault 2010) to incorporate an unfolding sensory apprehension of, 
and identification with, the social, with implications for critical management studies and 
beyond. 
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ANALYSIS 
Episode 1: Organizational structure 
Text 
 
Configuration of Social, 
Political and 
Fantasmatic Logics (cf. 
Fig 2) 
Andy (1): OK, moving onto the Company Handbook.   
(Tense) 
 
Will (1) [noncommittally]: Mmmmmm. 
 
Andy (2): [Sigh] We just don’t seem to take these things 
seriously here.  There’s no way we’re going to be able to get 
growth by competing with the likes of xxx and xxx unless we 
get some more robust structures in place.  And this includes 
more operational delivery management, more detailed 
internal reporting procedures and business planning at 
manager level, and a company code of practice.  We’re just 
going to come unstuck otherwise – you’ll see.  
(aarrgghhhh) 
Will (2) [tersely]: I’m sorry but you know the way I feel 
about this.  We already have perfectly good processes in 
place; we all want to carry on growing but there’s no way 
we’re going to throw the baby out with the bathwater.  We’re 
not… xxx, and we’re just going to lose that magic if we 
swamp people with rulebooks. 
Andy (3): [Visibly frustrated] Clearly, I’m not proposing 
swamping anyone with rulebooks, Andy, it’s just basic good 
practice.  I really…[sigh]. 
(unfriendly, want to leave) 
 
End of fragment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Episode 2: More sharing of client contacts 
Text Configuration of Social, 
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 Political and 
Fantasmatic Logics (cf. 
Fig 2) 
Andy (4):  We really need to think of a way of leveraging our 
contacts across the company better; working together properly.  
At the ABC supplier briefing, it was obvious that xxx and yyy 
had already spoken to the people in the business – and I know 
for a fact that Jill knows some of those people – I felt really 
foolish.  Things are tightening up, and going forwards our 
ability to form and draw on these relationships will be make or 
break. 
(Been-here-before/expectant) 
  
Will (3): [mischievously] Mmmm. So what are you proposing?  
You know that we’re a vertically oriented business, really, and 
I don’t think there’s any way that people are just going to give 
up their client relationships to other people without a good 
reason – certainly not because they’ve been told to. 
 
Andy (5): That’s not what I’m suggesting, Will.  [Pause].  
[Doggedly]: We need to get a more robust pipeline 
management approach in place, preferably underpinned with a 
web-based application we can all use from wherever we 
happen to be. 
(Cynicism, hardening) 
 
Will (4): Andy, people just won’t use it. 
(Feels unfriendly) 
 
End of fragment. 
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Figure 1: Four dimensions of social relations (Glynos and Howarth 2007:112), modified 
to include original explanatory text 
 
 
Figure 2: Four dimensions of social relations (Glynos and Howarth 2007:112), adapted 
to show empirical indicators of different configurations of Logics 
